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The Motivational Effects of School-Based Performance Awards
Abstract
From 1995-1998, CPRE teacher compensation researchers conducted extensive interviews and survey
questionnaires of teachers and principals in three sites to measure the motivational effects of school-based
performance award (SBPA) programs. When a school met preset educational objectives, usually related to
increases in student achievement, the SBPA programs in Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) and
Kentucky provided salary bonuses to all the teachers in the school and the SBPA program in Maryland
provided a monetary award to the school for school improvements.
CPRE researchers found that the SBPA programs in two of the three sites helped teachers focus on student
performance goals. However, the motivational power of the programs varied due to differences in teachers’
beliefs. For instance, it mattered whether teachers believed their individual effort would lead to increases in
schoolwide student performance, the SBPA system was fair and the award amount was worth the extra effort
and stress, and that they would be given the award if they could produce the improved performance results.
The relationship between teachers who were motivated by school-based performance awards or sanctions and
improvements in school performance also varied and may have been attributable to differences in the actual
programs as well as the local context.
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The Motivational Effects of School-Based
Performance Awards
by Carolyn Kelley, Allan Odden, Anthony Milanowski, and Herbert Heneman III
The Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) studies alternative approaches to education reform in order to
determine how state and local policies can promote student learning.  Currently, CPRE’s work is focusing on accountability
policies, efforts to build capacity at various levels within the education system, methods of allocating resources and compensat-
ing teachers, and governance changes like charters and mayoral takeover.  The results of this research are shared with policymakers,
educators, and other interested individuals and organizations in order to promote improvements in policy design and implemen-
tation. CPRE is supported by the National Institute on Educational Governance, Finance, Policymaking and Management,
Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education.
F
rom 1995-1998, CPRE teacher compensation re-
searchers conducted extensive interviews and
survey questionnaires of teachers and princi-
pals in three sites to measure the motivational
effects of school-based performance award (SBPA) pro-
grams. When a school met preset educational objectives,
usually related to increases in student achievement, the
SBPA programs in Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Caro-
lina) and Kentucky provided salary bonuses to all the
teachers in the school and the SBPA program in Mary-
land provided a monetary award to the school for school
improvements.
CPRE researchers found that the SBPA programs in two
of the three sites helped teachers focus on student per-
formance goals. However, the motivational power of the
programs varied due to differences in teachers’ beliefs.
For instance, it mattered whether teachers believed their
individual effort would lead to increases in schoolwide
student performance, the SBPA system was fair and the
award amount was worth the extra effort and stress, and
that they would be given the award if they could produce
the improved performance results. The relationship be-
tween teachers who were motivated by school-based per-
formance awards or sanctions and improvements in school
performance also varied and may have been attribut-
able to differences in the actual programs as well as the
local context.
The Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE)
studies how various state and local education policies sup-
port student learning. In order to promote improvements in
policy design and implementation, CPRE currently conducts
research in four areas vital to education reform: accountabil-
ity, capacity-building, governance, and school finance and re-
source reallocation. Among these studies is the Teacher Com-
pensation project, which through research, conceptual devel-
opment, and technical assistance seeks to explore ways in
which compensation might be better used to support the edu-
cation of all students to high standards and the continued
professionalization of teaching. The project seeks to better
understand the role of compensation in organizational devel-
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opment and ultimately to build on the strengths of existing
compensation systems in education and other sectors to make
compensation an important element in the support of stan-
dards-based education reform and teaching excellence.
Previous CPRE publications, such as Susan Fuhrman’s The
New Accountability (1999), emphasize the importance of
linking policy concepts to achieve the greatest effect. For
instance, new accountability systems that contain clear stan-
dards and strong incentives, but pay no attention to building
the capacity of teachers and administrators to support such
efforts, will not work. Conversely, capacity-building without
a clear system goal might also be ineffective.
One popular accountability strategy being used by an increas-
ing number of states and districts across the country is school-
based performance award programs. These programs are
intended to align individual or school-level monetary incen-
tives with a school’s ability to improve student achievement.
CPRE teacher compensation researchers examined several
school-based performance award programs to see if the de-
sign and implementation of the programs achieved the in-
tended results.
Description of the Study
Through on-site interviews with teachers and principals (all
sites), and mail surveys of teachers (Charlotte-Mecklenburg
and Kentucky) and principals (all three sites), CPRE research-
ers studied the motivational effects of school-based perfor-
mance award programs and whether teachers’ reactions
correlated with improved student achievement. The research-
ers used as their conceptual framework two well-known theo-
ries of individual motivation: expectancy theory and goal-set-
ting theory, which have an extensive research base. The re-
search design was not intended to measure if SBPA pro-
grams caused improvements in student achievement but
rather to discern the motivational effects of the SBPA pro-
grams on teachers.
The first motivational theory, expectancy theory, suggests
that teachers are most motivated when they have a strong
belief that they can achieve specified goals—their individual
actions will positively influence student achievement and val-
ued consequences will be achieved if the goals are met. This
theory directly links with issues of teacher and organizational
capacity, such as the extent to which teachers feel they are
supported by their principals and are given appropriate re-
sources like professional development to reach SBPA goals.
Moreover, the motivational impact also would depend on
whether teachers feel they have the pedagogical and content
knowledge and the curricular resources necessary to help
students reach the goals. In the context of SBPAs, the sec-
ond theory, goal-setting theory, translates into the idea that
clear and specific student achievement goals are more moti-
vating for teachers than unclear or conflicting goals.
These two theories of motivation also suggest that for SBPA
programs to work well, they need to have three major im-
pacts on teachers. First, there would be an increased focus
on student achievement goals due to goal clarity and the at-
tachment of valued consequences to goal achievement. Sec-
ond, teachers would have increased motivation to “do what
needs to be done” to achieve the goals by increasing their
commitment to the goals and attaching desirable and unde-
sirable outcomes to meeting or not meeting the goals. Finally,
school staff would increase their demand for the organiza-
tional resources needed for them to achieve the goals.
Six other conditions must also be present to maximize the
likelihood that SBPA programs would have these impacts on
teachers. First, teachers must believe that if they try they
can succeed in achieving program goals. Second, the posi-
tive outcomes associated with the program must be greater
than the negative outcomes, such as increased stress. Third,
the bonus must be aligned with other motivating outcomes,
such as seeing one’s students achieve at higher levels. Fourth,
the SBPA program’s goals must be consistent with the goals
of other improvement programs in place at the school. Fifth,
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the program must be perceived as fair, both in the likelihood
of success and in its operation. Finally, the program must be
properly implemented—the bonus amounts must be large
enough for teachers to want to work toward the bonus, there
must be a commitment to funding and other needed resources,
the plan must be well understood and communicated, and so
on.
A brief summary of the particular SBPA programs studied
follows. Please note that although Kentucky and Charlotte-
Mecklenburg represent two jurisdictions without formal col-
lective bargaining (Maryland has strong collective bargain-
ing), the findings are still relevant to contexts with stronger
union roles. CPRE is using the results of this research in its
work with the Teacher Union Reform Network to strengthen
the design of new or second generation SBPA programs.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg’s Benchmark Goals
Program
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District created the
Benchmark Goals Program in 1991 to help reverse a record
of low student achievement and limited success with minor-
ity students. The original Benchmark Goal Program set im-
provement goals for student achievement in nine areas: pri-
mary grade readiness, absenteeism, social studies, end-of-
grade reading, writing, pre-algebra, dropouts, higher level
course enrollment, and end-of-course subject matter mas-
tery. Additionally, schools had between 14 and 44 sub-goals.
(There have been changes since the initial program, includ-
ing the creation of a state-level SBPA program and adapta-
tions to Charlotte-Mecklenburg’s program intended to align it
with the state program.)
Student achievement in cognitive areas was assessed by stan-
dardized multiple-choice tests, and performance baselines
were established in 1991-1992. In every area, annual im-
provement goals were set for schools in each subsequent
school year, and schools received points for meeting those
goals. Schools that received 75 or more points were desig-
nated as “exemplary” and their certified staff received $1,000
and support staff $400. Schools that earned between 60 and
74 points were designated as “outstanding” and their certi-
fied staff received $750 and support staff $300. Staff in
schools that earned less than 60 points were not eligible for a
bonus. There were no formal sanctions for schools that failed
to achieve the accountability goals in any one year; however,
schools with chronically low achievement could be placed in
the Priority Schools program where, with district assistance,
they prepared special improvement plans and identified re-
sources needed to improve student achievement.
Kentucky’s Accountability Program
The Kentucky Accountability Program was created as part
of the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990. It held
schools accountable for improvement in seven academic sub-
jects (reading, writing, math, science, social studies, arts/hu-
manities, and vocational/practical living), and several school-
level indicators, such as student attendance, retention, and
dropout rates. The school performance index, derived from
assessments that were part of the Kentucky Instructional
Results Information System (KIRIS), consisted of portfolio
entries, performance events, open-response, and multiple-
choice questions.
Beginning with the 1991-1992 school year, the state set a
series of two-year goals for each school, with schools ex-
pected to increase their KIRIS scores by 10 percent of the
distance between their school’s baseline score and a long-
term target that is equivalent to 100 percent of students scor-
ing at the proficient level. The initial targets were based on
the 1991-1992 score and were reset after each accountabil-
ity cycle. If schools exceeded their goal, they were desig-
nated as “reward” schools and received funds that could be
used for any purpose, including salary bonuses, as decided
by a vote of the school’s certified staff. The amount awarded
to each school was based on the number of certified staff
employed and the degree to which the school exceeded its
goals. The minimum award amount was set at 50 percent of
the maximum award amount; the average bonus paid to teach-
ers at the end of the first accountability cycle (1991-1994)
was approximately $2,600.
Schools that dropped more than five points below baseline
were designated “in crisis.” Distinguished educators—expe-
rienced teachers and administrators trained by the state to
provide technical assistance—were assigned to crisis schools
and had the authority to terminate teachers and override school
site council decisions if they deemed it appropriate. In the
first biennium of the program, the crisis category was sus-
pended due to concerns about the reliability of the assess-
ment instrument. The crisis category was reinstated for the
second biennium and nine schools were designated “in cri-
sis.”
Maryland’s School Performance Program
The Maryland School Performance Program monitored school
progress toward state standards, rewarded school success
with monetary awards, and assisted or reconstituted schools
in which performance was declining. The school performance
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index, a weighted average of a school’s relative distance from
satisfactory standards for attendance and student perfor-
mance on two tests (the Maryland School Performance As-
sessment Program and the Maryland Functional Test) was
used to measure school performance and progress.
Elementary and middle schools that achieved a “sustained
and significant” level of improvement as judged by the Mary-
land Department of Education were eligible for a monetary
bonus that could be used for school improvements but not for
bonuses to staff. The amount of each school’s award de-
pended on the size of the state appropriation, the number of
eligible schools, and the number of students in the reward
schools. Between 1996 and 1998, awards ranged from about
$14,500 to $64,600 per school.
The Maryland State Department of Education released a
report card each December on state and district progress
toward meeting the standards, thus creating incentives in the
form of public recognition or public criticism. Schools that
failed to improve faced the possibility of some form of recon-
stitution, such as modifying the school’s instructional program,
replacing the school’s administrative or teaching personnel,
or even having a third party contracted to run the school. To
date, 97 schools have been listed as eligible for reconstitu-
tion, with the majority of them being in Baltimore City.
What We Learned
Our empirical research showed that teachers working in SBPA
program schools knew the goals of the program, understood
them, and were committed to their achievement at high lev-
els relative to other types of education reform efforts. Teach-
ers who placed greater value on the bonus, and believed that
if performance improved the bonus would be paid as prom-
ised, reported higher levels of goal clarity and commitment.
Most teachers reported that they were trying to meet the
goals of the program.
Goal clarity was positively related to school performance.
Our research suggested that providing rewards for too many
goals could diffuse effort and responsibility so teachers would
lose focus on what steps they could take to achieve the goals.
Conversely, limiting rewards to too few goals, just reading
and mathematics achievement, for example, could result in
inattention to important but unmeasured outcomes.
Similarly, our research found that the goals of the program
must be consistent with the goals of other organizational pro-
grams or the motivational power of SBPA programs was
diluted. Teachers in schools with strong conflicting goals were
less likely to believe that they could achieve the goals and,
indeed, their schools were less successful in improving stu-
dent performance. Also, schools with goal conflict—for ex-
ample, magnet schools with strong themes that diverged from
the SBPA program goals—often lacked principal leadership
that directed teachers to focus on SBPA program goals. This
put teachers in the position of having to choose between the
SBPA goals or the magnet school goals.
Research showed that the most important motivational fac-
tor in determining whether schools succeeded in meeting the
SBPA performance goals was whether teachers thought they
could collectively produce the desired improvements. But at
the same time, we found that teacher expectancy was quite
low in the SBPA programs we studied. Our research sug-
gested that expectancy was influenced by the presence of
various capacity-building conditions and other supportive dis-
trict actions, like the creation of an information system and
leadership from the principal and central office around stan-
dards-based instruction. Also important was teacher knowl-
edge and skills related to improved instruction.
The alignment of vital organizational resources to help teach-
ers improve student performance was identified as impor-
tant. Specifically, we found that the more successful schools
were characterized by strong principal and district leadership
supporting program goals, feedback on student assessment
measures and results, a history of success with the program,
meaningful professional development related to program goals,
and structured teacher collaboration. Our research suggested
that SBPA programs should be combined with other policies
to build school and teacher capacity effectively and to align
internal accountability systems with external accountability
goals. The programs also should provide focused attention at
all levels on achieving improvement goals.
With respect to the bonus itself, our research showed that
the salary bonus is one of the top four valued outcomes that
teachers experienced as a result of the SBPA program (See
Table 1). Other valued outcomes included personal satisfac-
tion from meeting program goals and from seeing improved
student performance, opportunities to work with other teach-
Impact of SBPA Programs
• Focuses attention on goals
• Motivates teachers
• Channels organizational resources
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ers, public recognition for school success in meeting goals,
and opportunities to work toward clear school-wide goals.
The bonus, together with these other rewards produced by
the SBPA program, provided a strong motivation to change
teaching practice.
Research did reveal that SBPA programs could also produce
some negative consequences. Teachers indicated that in the
process of trying to achieve the goals, they experienced a
number of negative outcomes, including increased pressure
and stress and increased hours worked. Programs with ex-
ternally imposed standards and continuous improvement com-
ponents, such as those in Kentucky and Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, produced higher levels of pressure and stress
than programs without these design features.
Teachers believed that payment of a bonus was appropriate
for improvements in school performance; however, in some
cases, the bonus was not deemed large enough to be a mean-
ingful incentive for teachers to be motivated by it. Teachers
agreed that larger bonuses would be more motivating and
that if bonuses were too small, teachers might view them
more as insults than incentives. For example, Charlotte-
Mecklenburg teachers complained that in light of overall low
wages for teachers, the relatively small bonus ($400 to $600
after taxes) was too small to be viewed as a reward for all
the additional work it took to earn it.
Further, while the desirability of receiving a bonus was rated
relatively high, teachers were not certain that if they achieved
the goals they would actually receive the bonus. The doubt
about receiving the earned bonuses appeared attributable ei-
ther to past experiences with bonuses being reneged  or to
beliefs that the funding for the bonuses would be discontin-
ued. However, despite the general suspicion about actually
receiving an earned bonus, teachers in schools that had
achieved reward status were more likely to believe that if
they met the goals they would be rewarded again.
a. Scale: 1 = highly undesirable…5 = highly desirable.
b. All differences between comparable Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Kentucky averages are statistically significant at the .05 level or beyond.
c. $1,000 in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, $2,000 in Kentucky.
d. Charlotte-Mecklenburg respondents were asked to rate the desirability of avoiding these outcomes; Kentucky respondents were asked to rate the
desirability or undesirability of the outcomes themselves.
e. Charlotte-Mecklenburg respondents were asked about having their school designated a Priority School; Kentucky respondents were asked about
having a Distinguished Educator assigned to their school.
Outcomeb Charlotte-Mecklenburg Kentucky 
(Mean) (Mean)
Goal Attainment Rewards
Receiving a bonus for meeting goalsc 4.5 4.1
Receiving school improvement funds for meeting goals 4.4 4.1
Public recognition for meeting goals 4.1 4.0
Personal satisfaction for meeting goals 4.3 4.2
Personal satisfaction from improved student performance 4.6 4.4
Learning
Participation in education reform program 3.6 3.2
Having clear school-wide goals 4.4 4.3
Working cooperatively with other teachers on curriculum and instruction 4.3 4.0
Having your students learn new skills 4.5 4.4
Having additional opportunities for professional development 4.3 3.9
Sanctions
Public criticism or embarrassment due to not achieving goalsd 4.4 1.6
Loss of professional pride due to not achieving goalsd 3.6 1.8
Risks to job securityd 3.9 1.6
Interventiond,e 3.7 1.8
Stress
Putting in more hours 2.0 1.9
Less freedom to teach things unrelated to goals 2.0 1.9
More pressure and job stress 1.6 1.5
Table 1
Desirability of Outcomes Associated with School-Based Performance Award Programsa
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Research also revealed that fairness was central to the suc-
cess of SBPA programs. For this purpose we defined two
types of fairness: substantive fairness—the development
of program designs that adequately account for differences
in student populations and school resources; and procedural
fairness—establishing, communicating, and following the rules
so that teachers know what is expected of them. Procedural
fairness also involves providing and following an appeal pro-
cedure and treating teachers or schools equitably according
to program rules. Both types of fairness appear to be impor-
tant in order for SBPA programs to be motivating.
We found that, on average, teachers neither agreed nor dis-
agreed that the SBPA programs were substantively fair, and
they slightly disagreed that the programs were procedurally
fair. Both types of fairness proved to be related to teacher
expectancy, with teachers who perceived the programs as
fair to be more likely to believe that their efforts could im-
prove student performance.
Implications for Policymakers
It would be inappropriate to suggest that there is only one
way to design an SBPA program aimed at improving student
achievement. It is evident from the research findings noted
above that there is variation in both teacher attitudes and in
actual outcomes. However, we believe that our research find-
ings have important policy implications for people who are
designing an SBPA program.
SBPA programs work by producing high levels of aware-
ness of program goals and by focusing teacher, school, and
district efforts on goal achievement. Thus, the power of SBPA
programs is in their ability to focus teacher efforts and chan-
nel organizational resources to key educational goals. To that
end, program designers must consciously and deliberately
align SBPA goals with other school goals. If perfect align-
ment is not possible, the relative priority of the SBPA goals
compared to other goals must be made very clear.
Checklist for Creating a More Successful SBPA Program
___ Provide feedback on the results of past assessments to help teachers refine curriculum and instruction.
___ Make sure SBPA goals do not compete with other school goals.
___ Institutionalize a consistent source of funding for school-based performance awards.
___ Set the bonus amount high enough to compensate for increased stress and hours worked.
___ Involve teachers in the design and implementation process so they help decide the level of improvement sought
and the mechanics of the program.
___ Measure every performance goal in a systematic, valid, and reliable way.
___ Select equitable measures that address student mobility, students with disabilities, limited English proficient
students, students from low-income backgrounds, etc. to calculate rewards.
___ Attain the active support of the principal.
___ Evaluate and adjust the SBPA program as needed.
In addition to the above checklist, more information on SBPA program design and administration can be found in
the paper, “School-Based Performance Award Programs: Design and Administration Issues Synthesized from
Eight Programs,” by Allan Odden, Eileen Kellor, Herbert Heneman, and Anthony Milanowski.  The paper is the
outgrowth of a research conference on designing and administering SBPA programs sponsored by CPRE-Univer-
sity of Wisconsin in October 1998. The paper is available at www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre/teachercomp/.
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For an SBPA to be successful, teachers must believe that if
they try they can succeed in achieving program goals (teacher
expectancy). Thus, the power of SBPA programs to moti-
vate could be greatly strengthened by increasing teacher ex-
pectancy. One way to do this is by providing more of the
conditions needed for the goals to be met; the SBPA pro-
gram can create or enhance the presence of these condi-
tions. For example, teachers may have more opportunities to
collaborate about educational goals as a result of the account-
ability program. Similarly, school-based performance award
programs can foster goal focus, enhance the development of
relevant teacher knowledge and skills through opportunities
for professional development, focus district efforts, and pro-
vide guidelines for policy consistency. The development of
knowledge- and skill-based pay and the creation of interven-
tions, such as the Kentucky Distinguished Educator program,
for declining schools are but two additional efforts that could
enhance the necessary enabling conditions.
Program designers should look to developing rich human capi-
tal resources in schools. This can take many forms, including
providing appropriate and meaningful professional develop-
ment opportunities for teachers as well as providing opportu-
nities for teachers to use their strengths in areas beyond the
classroom. Linking compensation to knowledge and skills and
appropriate professional development can also increase
teacher buy-in and motivation to change their practice to im-
prove student achievement.
Another strategy is to establish professional networks exter-
nal to the school that give teachers insight into program goals
and strategies for improvement. For example, in Kentucky,
some schools that failed to achieve program goals were pro-
vided external educational experts in the subsequent year
who worked individually and collectively with teachers to
develop teacher knowledge and skills needed to achieve pro-
gram goals.
A specific area that our research identified as in need of
additional focused attention is more active support and pro-
gram management from principals. The active commitment
of principals is crucial to the success of SBPA programs, yet
principals often have little or no guidance from the district or
state as to how to carry out program goals. Our site inter-
views revealed a high level of variability in the extent to which
the principals fostered teacher commitment to the program.
While some were very proactive, others seemed genuinely
at a loss as to how to rally their staff and help them achieve
the goals. Thus, for an SBPA program to have maximum
motivating effect, program designers must pay specific at-
tention to the critical variable of principal leadership.
Program designers must be sure to provide positive outcomes
that outweigh the negative outcomes to make it more likely
that teachers will change their behaviors in order to meet the
goals and receive the salary bonus. A basic assumption un-
derlying SBPA program design is that the goal and the award
will act as an incentive; paying salary bonuses appears to
provide stronger incentives than other types of performance
outcomes, such as publicity and bonuses paid in the form of
school improvement funds. Nonetheless, there are trade-offs
in any design approach and while continuous improvement
and externally imposed standards increase pressure and
stress, they also are likely to produce more significant changes
to curriculum and instruction over time.
Thus, for an SBPA to be motivating, program designers must
be sure that teachers will believe that the bonus and other
outcomes associated with goal achievement are worth the
effort. One way to do this is to enhance positive outcomes by
providing larger award amounts, better feedback on student
performance, and enhanced opportunities for teacher col-
laboration and professional growth. The evidence from our
research combined with research on bonus incentives in other
types of organizations suggest that bonuses equivalent to 3-5
percent of base salary (about $2,000 per teacher per year)
would be meaningful and motivating.
Program designers also must set goals at a level that is achiev-
able so teachers will perceive that they are capable of meet-
ing the goal and thus receiving the award. In addition, teach-
ers must have faith that the award will actually be given to
those who meet the goals. This trust could be strengthened
by improving communication between labor and management,
by attaining a strong and sustained policymaker commitment
to the SBPA program, and by providing a funding source that
is insulated from cuts due to cyclical variations in educational
resources.
Our research suggests that program designers can enhance
both substantive and procedural fairness through the involve-
ment of all key parties in the design process to ensure that
variations in school context are adequately addressed in the
program design. In addition, the program should include an
ongoing and significant investment in communication to teach-
ers, principals, district administrators, parents, and the public.
The information communicated to these stakeholder groups
should go beyond a brief overview of the program. It should
include information about program rules and procedures, pro-
gram outcomes, appeal procedures, material to be covered
on the assessment, rubrics and procedures for grading the
assessments, changes in the program or assessment, and pro-
gram rationale over time.
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Program designers must be sure that the goals and indicators
used to assess progress pass the “face validity” test; that is,
can teachers understand them and do they believe that the
goals and indicators are a fair assessment of educational
progress? If teachers understand and accept the goals, both
teacher expectancy and motivation to achieve the goals will
be enhanced.
Summary
SBPA programs work to focus teacher and system attention
on key educational goals. Current designs have a number of
key elements in place, such as rewards that are school-based,
a focus on continuous improvement (so each school com-
petes with its own past performance), and frequently, imple-
mentation in the context of larger standards-based reform
efforts. These programs are most effective when they are
combined with comprehensive strategies to build school ca-
pacity and focus teacher attention and school and district
resources on achieving program goals.
However, our empirical research suggests that the motiva-
tional press of SBPA programs could be strengthened by a
better communication of goals, enhanced teacher expectancy,
enhanced teacher perceptions that earned awards will be
funded, and experimentation with larger award amounts. We
believe that policymakers could improve the design of their
SBPA programs by addressing these areas, as well as by
engaging in a participative and well-planned design process.
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More on the Subject
School-Based Performance Award Programs, Teacher
Motivation, and School Performance: Findings from a
Study of Three Programs, a new CPRE Research Report
upon which this Policy Brief was based, is now available.
The cost is $10.00 per copy. To order, write: CPRE Publica-
tions, 3440 Market Street, Suite 560, Philadelphia PA 19104-
3325.
Prices include handling and book-rate postage (Add $10 ship-
ping and handling for delivery outside the U.S.). Sales tax is
not applicable. For information on quantity discounts (over
25 copies), call 215/573-0700. Sorry, we cannot accept re-
turns, credit card orders, or purchase orders. All orders must
be prepaid with U.S. funds from U.S. banks; make checks
payable to Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania.
Please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery.
CPRE on the Internet
For more information about CPRE’s teacher compensa-
tion project, please visit our site on the world wide web:
www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre/teachercomp/
This web site describes the history of teacher pay, the cur-
rent teacher compensation system, and explains alternative
forms of teacher compensation. The site describes the work
and key findings of CPRE’s research on teacher compensa-
tion, provides information on state and local school teacher
compensation reform initiatives, features an annotated bibli-
ography of teacher compensation publications, and includes
a wide variety of resources on teacher compensation.
Additional information about CPRE can be found at on
the following web sites:
www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre/
This site features information on CPRE’s school finance, pro-
gram adequacy, resource reallocation, and teacher compen-
sation projects.
www.upenn.edu/gse/cpre/
This site features a wealth of information including detailed
descriptions of current research projects, a paper of the month,
biographies of CPRE’s researchers, and links to other edu-
cational sites. Short descriptions of CPRE’s many publica-
tions are available and, at present, over 100 different publica-
tions can be downloaded from the site at no charge.
New Books by CPRE Researchers
CPRE researchers recently authored two new books based
upon CPRE research.
Can Public Schools Learn from Private Schools? Case
Studies in the Public and Private Nonprofit Sectors
Available from: Economic Policy Institute, 1660 L Street,
N.W., Suite 1200, Washington, D.C. 20036. Phone: 1-800-
EPI-4844. Email: publications@epinet.org. Web:
www.epinet.org. ISBN: 0-944826-84-9. (1999, $13.95).
Authors Richard Rothstein (Economic Policy Institute), Mar-
tin Carnoy (Stanford University), and Luis Benveniste (World
Bank) report on case studies conducted to determine whether
there are any private school practices that public schools can
adopt to improve student outcomes. The book reports on re-
search funded by the Aspen Institute and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education’s National Institute on Educational Gov-
ernance, Finance, Policymaking and Management.
School-Based Financing
Available from: Corwin Press, Inc., 2455 Teller Road, Thou-
sand Oaks, CA 91320-2218. Phone: 805-499-9734. Email:
order@corwinpress.com. Web: www.corwinpress.com.
ISBN: 0-8039-6779-9. (1999, $54.95).
Edited by Margaret Goertz (University of Pennsylvania) and
Allan Odden (University of Wisconsin-Madison), this book
offers a conceptual overview of the issues involved in de-
signing, implementing, and evaluating school-based financing
policies. It also reports on the experiences of three countries
that have enacted school-based financing policies, discusses
different approaches to funding schools in the United States,
and provides insight into how schools allocate and reallocate
dollars.
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Recent CPRE Publications
Improving State School Finance Systems: New Realities Create Need to Re-Engineer School Finance Structures
Allan Odden
February 1999 (No. OP-04) 43 pp., $6
Explores the inadequacies of state school finance systems and recommends short-term changes that states can make to their
funding structures in order to accommodate more fundamental and long-term changes.
Instruction, Capacity, and Improvement
David Cohen and Deborah Loewenberg Ball
June 1999 (No. RR-043) 41 pp., $10
Develops a theoretical view of instruction and then provides an analysis of the environments of instruction. Concludes with a
discussion of the problems and possibilities for intervention.
School-Based Performance Award Programs, Teacher Motivation, and School Performance: Findings from a Study
of Three Programs
Carolyn Kelley, Herbert Heneman III, and Anthony Milanowski
January 2000 (No. RR-044), $10
Focuses on teachers’ motivational reactions to school-based performance award programs, the degree to which teachers’
motivational reactions are related to school performance, and principals’ assessments of the effects of the programs.
State Strategies for Building Capacity in Education: Progress and Continuing Challenges
Diane Massell
October 1998 (No. RR-041) 63 pp., $12
Examines capacity-building strategies used in eight states (California, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Texas) and analyzes their promise and continuing challenges.
Teaching for High Standards: What Policymakers Need to Know and Be Able to Do
Linda Darling-Hammond and Deborah Loewenberg Ball
November 1998 (No. JRE-04) 33 pp., $10
Discusses the relationship between teacher knowledge and student performance and describes what states are doing to
provide opportunities for teacher learning and with what effects. Summarizes what research suggests about the kinds of
teacher education and professional development that teachers need in order to learn how to teach to high standards. (Co-published
by CPRE and the National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future).
When Accountability Knocks, Will Anyone Answer?
Charles Abelmann and Richard Elmore, with Johanna Even, Susan Kenyon, and Joanne Marshall
March 1999 (No. RR-042) 51 pp., $10
Presents a working theory of school-site accountability among three factors: responsibility, expectations, and internal and
external accountability. Short case studies of a diverse sample of schools are included.
To order, write: CPRE Publications, 3440 Market Street, Suite 560, Philadelphia PA 19104-3325. Prices include handling and book-rate
postage (Add $10 shipping and handling for delivery outside the U.S.). Sales tax is not applicable. For information on quantity
discounts (over 25 copies), call 215/573-0700. Sorry, we cannot accept returns, credit card orders, or purchase orders. All orders must
be prepaid with U.S. funds from U.S. banks; make checks payable to CPRE/Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania. Please allow
4-6 weeks for delivery.
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